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Hearsay Logic*
Peter Tillers** and David Schum***
I. THE HEARSAY RULE, CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND

TESTIMONIAL QUALITIES
The paterfamilias of modem American evidence scholarship, John Henry Wigmore, argued that the hearsay rule serves
the purpose of protecting the right of a party to cross-examine
adverse witnesses.' Wigmore had a high opinion of cross-examination; he described it as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' 2 He believed that one major
purpose of cross-examination is that it allows a party to explore
the testimonial qualities of witnesses, such as veracity. The
hearsay rule, he thought, protects the right of parties to use
cross-examination to scrutinize the relevant testimonial characteristics of witnesses. 3
* The research for this Article was supported by National Science
Foundation (NSF) Grant SES-9007693 to George Mason University. We also
owe much to Anne Martin's seminal Bayesian analysis of hearsay. See Anne
Martin, Cascaded Inference and Hearsay 25 (Dec. 1, 1979) (unpublished
manuscript, Rice U. Research Rep. No. 79-03). We thank Richard Lempert,
Lash LaRue, and Craig Callen for their comments. We are also grateful to
Roger Park and the University of Minnesota Law School for giving us an
opportunity to discuss our ideas about hearsay. None of these sources of
inspiration and support shares responsibility for any errors in this Article.
** Professor of Law & Director, International Seminar on Evidence in
Litigation, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
*** Professor of Information Technology and Engineering, George Mason
University.
1. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362, at
3 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
2. I& § 1367, at 32.
3. I& § 1368, at 37; id- § 1420, at 251 ("The theory of the hearsay rule...
is that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which
may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be
brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination.").
One should distinguish, however, between Wigmore's theory of the role of testimonial qualities for the assessment of testimonial evidence and his view of
their role in witness competency determinations. Wigmore vigorously and successfully campaigned against common law rules that disqualified witnesses for
testimonial defects such as "interest" or "insanity." See, e.g., 2 JOHN H. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§ 501, at 709 (James H.

Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) (criticizing automatic disqualification of witnesses for
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Few legal scholars today have as much enthusiasm for
cross-examination as Wigmore did. Moreover, many legal
scholars quibble with Wigmore's view of the relationship between the hearsay rule and cross-examination. Nonetheless,
Wigmore's rationale for the hearsay rule remains important.
Wigmore based his explanation of the purpose of the hearsay
rule on a general theory of testimonial evidence and witness
credibility. Probably every knowledgeable evidence scholar today believes that any argument about the credibility of a witness that does not address the strengths and weaknesses of the
witness's testimonial capacities is inadequate. Hence, today virtually every knowledgeable student of the law of evidence tacitly or expressly accepts Wigmore's general theory of
4
testimonial credibility.
In the parlance of behavioral psychology, testimonial qualities are behavioral characteristics. A surprising degree of
agreement among legal scholars exists regarding the behavioral
characteristics that are relevant to credibility. In discussions of
the hearsay rule, it is generally said that the relevant behavioral characteristics are narration, veracity, memory, and perception. 5 Although our own taxonomy of testimonial
characteristics is a bit different, we readily embrace the thesis
that behavioral characteristics such as veracity are relevant to
the assessment of both hearsay and in-court testimonial evi"madness"). However, Wigmore certainly expected and wanted the trier of
fact to consider the testimonial capacities of witnesses when assessing the probative force of their testimony. See, e.g., id. § 477, at 635 (asserting that one
method of impeachment includes showing witness's "bad character for veracity" and "poor recollection").
4. We do not mean to intimate that Wigmore invented the idea that the
testimonial qualities of witnesses are important for judgments about the the
credibility and probative value of testimonial evidence. However, it is safe to
say that Wigmore's views of the relationship between testimonial capacity,
credibility, and probative value significantly influenced American legal thinking about testimonial evidence. Wigmore's influence on the American law of
evidence was enormous in his own lifetime and remains substantial today.
5. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and
Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 685 (1987) (stating that the "testimonial capacities"
are "perception, memory, sincerity, and articulateness"); Eleanor Swift, A
Foundation FactApproach to Hearsay,75 CAL. L. REV.1341, 1341 (1987) (listing the four testimonial qualities of perception, memory, sincerity, and language use"); Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay,87 HARv. L. REv. 957,
959 (1974) (analyzing "ambiguity, insincerity, erroneous memory, and faulty
perception"); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 188 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (listing "memory, opportunity to observe, meaning, and veracity");
rf CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 726 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (discussing "perception, memory, and narration of
the witness").
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dence. Moreover, we share Wigmore's view that characteristics
such as veracity are relevant for assessing testimonial evidence
in general, not just for the assessment of the credibility of hearsay declarants; that is, like Wigmore, we believe that a theory
of hearsay credibility must be part of a more general theory of
testimonial credibility.
II. NON-LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON CREDIBILITY AND
TESTIMONIAL QUALITIES
A.

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AD EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY

The law of evidence, by its nature, is a type of epistemological theory. The epistemology of the American law of evidence
has an empiricist tinge.6 The law governing testimonial evidence incorporates the key empiricist tenet that all valid
knowledge of the world ultimately rests on information gained
through the senses; the law of evidence permits a witness to
testify only if there is some evidence showing that the witness
has "personal knowledge."7
6. See WmLLxAm TWING, THEORIES OF EvIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE
1-18 (1985) (describing the "rationalist tradition of evidence scholarship"); 1A
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 37 (Peter Tillers
rev. ed. 1983); cf BARBARA J. SHAPmO, PROBABLIY AND CERTANTY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTuRY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BErwEEN
NATURAL SCIENE, RELIGION, HISTORY, LAw, AND LITERATURE 163-93 (1983).

The connection to empiricist tenets is more than conceptual; it is also historical. The work of figures such as J.S. Mill and, above all, Jeremy Bentham influenced the developments in the law of evidence. Wigmore, for example,
relied extensively on Bentham and, to a lesser extent, on John Stuart Mill.
See, e.g., 1 WIGMORE, supra, § 1, at 9 (quoting Bentham); 1A WIGMORE, supra,
§ 33, at 996-98 (quoting Sidgwick, a disciple of J.S. Mill). On the question of
Bentham's influence on the law of evidence and legal scholarship generally,
see TWINING, supra, at 19-108.
7. FED.R. EVID. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter."). However, the legal requirement of personal
knowledge is not as substantial as it might seem. Generally, it need not be
shown that the witness actually have "knowledge," but only that the witness
had a (reasonable) possibility of acquiring knowledge "first-hand," i.e., by personal or direct observation. McCORMICK, supranote 5, § 10, at 24 ("[I]f under
the circumstances proved, reasonable men could differ as to whether the witness did or did not ...observe, then the testimony of the witness should come
in, and the jury will appraise his opportunity to know in evaluating the testimony.") (footnote omitted); see also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 658, at 894 (explaining that a "witness' observation need not be [of7 positive or absolute
certainty").
The view that knowledge of the world depends on knowledge gathered
through the senses is not the exclusive property of the Anglo-American law of
evidence, nor is it exclusive to the legal field. This empiricist tenet informs
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The law of evidence may bear the imprint of empiricist
theories of knowledge, but the law's treatment of testimonial
evidence is incompatible with some of the cruder variants of
empiricism. The law of evidence effectively rejects the view
that human beings are nothing more than passive receptors or
collectors of sensations, "sensa," or sense experience.8 The law
assumes that witnesses may lie. Moreover, although hearsay
theorists ordinarily do not list the objectivity or impartiality of
a witness as one of the basic testimonial qualities, the law of evidence attaches considerable importance to this behavioral
characteristic. It is standard legal learning that a witness may
be impeached by a showing of "bias" or "interest."9 Although
legal rules allowing impeachment for bias and interest may not
presuppose that people decide what to believe,10 the law's interest in the objectivity and impartiality of witnesses at least presupposes that bias and similar matters can influence how
witnesses interpret, or assess, their observations and perceptions. Thus, the law of evidence is not interested solely in the
perceptual capacities of witnesses or in their ability to collect
"raw" data.
scholarship and research in a great many fields of knowledge. For example,
the entire discipline of sensory psychophysics concerns the means by which
people gain knowledge of the world from sensory evidence. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MARKS, SENSORY PROCESSES: THE NEW PsYCHOPHYSics (1974); S.S.
STEVENS, PSYCHOPHYSICS: INTRODUCTION To ITs PERCEFIruAL, NEURAL, AND
SOCIAL PROSPECTS (1975). This body of scholarship offers some assurance, if

any is needed, that the law's emphasis on the importance of direct sensory evidence is warranted.
8. It is not easy to cite examples of serious thinkers who truly believed
that human beings play only the role of passive collectors of sense data. Some
theorists may have taken such a view, however. For example, some strands of
David Hume's work-particularly his critique of concepts of causation-suggest that he occasionally did think that human beings play a passive rather
than an active role in perception and understanding. See, e.g., DAvID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE Book I, pt. III, §§ 1-2, 14, at 69-78, 155-72 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1896). There is no dearth of theorists who believe that
human beings play an active role in the acquisition of sensory information and
empirical knowledge. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE MECHANISMS OF PERCEPTION
at xv-xxix (G.N. Seagrin trans., 1969); IRVIN ROCK, THE LOGIC OF PERCEPTION

1-20 (1983).
9. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 40, at 85-89; 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 943-969 (James H. Chadbourn

rev. ed. 1970). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has said that this form of tes-

timonial impeachment is permissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984).
10. Cf L. Jonathan Cohen, Should a Jury Say What It Believes or What
It Accepts?, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 465, 465-68 (1991) (drawing a distinction between "belief" and "acceptance").
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B. CREDIBILITY AND SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY
The view that human beings make decisions about what to
say and believe and that their expectations and interests influence their beliefs is now supported by a large body of non-legal
scholarship. Of particular relevance is a body of research in
psychology concerning human observation skills." In one of
the happier instances of cross-disciplinary fertilization in psychology, some psychologists borrowed insights from a theory
called signal detection theory (SDT) to study human observational and perceptual activities. SDT's original purpose was to
improve the design of radar and other mechanical sensing devices, but some psychologists thought that SDT might provide a
fruitful conceptual framework for experimental study of the
detection, recognition, and reporting of information-carrying
"signals" by human observers. 2
SDT does not view human observers as passive collectors
of signals but as active processors of sense data; it assumes that
human observers make decisions about what to believe and report. The methodology of traditional research in psychology
did not permit researchers to disentangle the effects of sensory
and decisional variables on the reporting behavior of human observers. The methodology of SDT experiments, however, permits orthogonal or independent assessments of both a person's
sensory sensitivity and her criterion for deciding whether to say
"yes" or "no" in response to a question concerning the presence
of some signal or stimulus. Unlike earlier studies, SDT experiments assume that a person's reported beliefs about an observa11. Experimental psychologists have conducted countless studies since the
middle 1800s using experimental subjects to determine sensory-perceptual
processes. Until recently these studies were premised on a distinction between
"sensory events" and "perceptual events." Sensory events were thought to involve only sensory end-organs. These events, it was thought, were peripheral
to the subject matter of psychology. Perceptual events, by contrast, were
thought to be of central importance. It was believed that these events involve

the brain's integration of sensory inputs with information already stored in the
brain. In more recent years, a different view of sensory and perceptual
processes has emerged in psychology. It is now widely believed that sensory
and perceptual processes are made of the same cloth, with no sharp distinction
between them. As a result, today few, if any, psychologists believe that sensory inputs are written on a blank tablet; the integrative operations of the
brain are thought to influence "sensory events" and "sensory inputs" as well
as "perceptual events" and perceptual processes.
12. See, e.g., JAMES P. EGAN, SIGNAL DETECrION THEORY AND ROC ANALYSLs (1975); DAviD M. GREEN & JOHN A. Swrs, SIGNAL DFrECnON THEORY
AND PSYCHOPHYSICS (1966); SIGNAL DETECION AND RECOGNITION BY HUMAN
OBSERVERS (John A. Swets ed., 1964).
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tion are inconclusive evidence about what the person actually
sensed. SDT assumes that on occasion a subject will believe
that a signal occurred when it did not occur and that on other
occasions a subject will not believe a signal occurred when it
did occur.
SDT studies show that decision criteria (for saying "yes" or
"no") involve matters such as expectancies and desires.' 3 The
insight that expectations and desires may influence the testimony of a witness is entirely familiar to students of the law of
evidence. Furthermore, as we have noted already, the law of
evidence assumes that human beings are more than passive receptors or collectors of sense data. The law may take comfort
from the fact that scholarship in psychology and in other fields
supports this assumption.
C.

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND PROBABILITY THEORY

Probabilists traditionally have studied the effect of known
events on the probability of hypotheses; few of them have studied the probative force of unknown or uncertain events on a
hypothesis. In recent years, however, the phenomenon of multistage inferential reasoning has attracted an increasing amount
of attention. This work has paved the way for a more sophisticated analysis of the problem of testimonial and hearsay evidence. Testimonial evidence of any kind presents the problem
of "source uncertainty." Source uncertainty is a special case of
the general problem of multistage, or hierarchical, inference.
An event E that serves as evidence of a hypothesis H may
itself be uncertain. When this happens, it is often appropriate
and necessary to treat E as a hypothesis. Moreover, if it is assumed that the probability of E, like the probability of H, may
be affected by another event (e.g., X), E also may be seen as a
possible conclusion based on an inference from evidence. Like
any other inference, of course, this inference ordinarily is uncertain; i.e., we are not certain, given the available evidence,
that we truly and really "have" E.
Figure 1 is a representation of the most simple type of multistage inference. The evidence represented by the black box in
Figure 1 may be any kind of event or evidence that affects the
probability of the proposition or hypothesis designated by E.
Our immediate concern is with testimonial evidence rather
13. In signal detection studies, however, it usually is assumed that an observer truthfully reports what she actually believes. In our own work, of
course, we do not accept the assumption that people always are truthful.
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than with problems of multistage inference in general. Testimonial evidence involves a report of an event. It is both convenient and important to have a method of representation that
distinguishes testimonial evidence from other types of evidence
suggesting or supporting an intermediate probandum E.14
Although both testimonial and hearsay evidence involve the
problem of inconclusive chains of inference, the properties of
testimonial evidence are different from those of other kinds of
evidence; special forms of uncertainty emerge when the indicium of an intermediate probandum E is a report, or testimonial assertion, rather than direct physical or sensory evidence.
The diagram in Figure 2 uses an asterisk to indicate that the evidence for an intermediate probandum is a person's report or
assertion that something is true. Hence, in Figure 2, E*
designates a report or assertion of E.
Although arguments about testimonial evidence have distinctive characteristics, they are nevertheless a form of multi14. Assessment of the probative value of testimonial evidence ordinarily
requires at least a two-stage inferential argument. This is due to the underlying premise that all evidence is always or almost always inconclusive. If evidence in general is often or always inconclusive, any matter shown or
established by a witness may in turn be uncertain or inconclusive evidence of
some further hypothesis or question of fact. Hence, if we are interested in a
report of an event because we believe that the event reported may serve as
evidence of some other possible factual event, we have to draw at least two
inferences to assess the significance of the report. However, it is possible that
some testimonial evidence presents a problem requiring only a single inference. In some situations, matters such as the sensations or beliefs of a witness
may be all that we wish to know.
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stage inferential reasoning. There are important subtleties in
testimonial evidence that cannot be elicited if the chain-like
character of inferential argument about testimonial evidence is
ignored. In the next section we examine a theory of the relationship between judgments about the credibility of a source
and judgments about the behavioral attributes of the source. 15
Described in jurisprudential terms, this theory addresses the
relationship between credibility and testimonial qualities. This
theory takes the view that judgments about testimonial qualities constitute links in a chain of argument about testimonial
evidence. We describe this theory here because it is the foundation of an important part of our theory of "hearsay logic."
III. THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT BASED ON
TESTIMONIAL ATTRIBUTES

A. CREDIBILITY AS A MULTI-ATTRIBUTE CHARACTERISTIC
In Part II.B. of this Article, we described a method of representing an argument in which the event that serves as evidence for a hypothesis is itself an uncertain hypothesis that
rests on a report of the occurrence of that event. Although our
representation of that simple type of source uncertainty is informative and useful, it is important to have a more refined
15. This theory was developed by one of the authors of this Article. See
David A. Schum, Knowledge, Probability,and Credibility, 2 J. BEHAVIORAL
DECISION MAKING 39 (1989).
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representation of the matters that bear on uncertainty about
the link between an event E and the report of that event E*.
Because uncertainty about E given E* may be affected by the
attributes of the person who makes the report E*, we need a
representation showing that the probative value of E* on E and
H may be affected by relevant attributes of the source of the
report E*. The diagram in Figure 3 is one such representation.
E

E = Event or events
asserted b witness

TSensr

I~nitvi

f
ES

Objectivitg

Eb
S

lWitness

V e ra cit u I

Tsimon

I FIGURE 3
Figure 3 depicts the possibility that a witness's veracity, objectivity, and sensory sensitivity may affect the probative force
of his report for the event E and the hypothesis H.1 6 (For pres16. Many probabilists have tried to use single numbers in the conven-

tional zero-one probability interval to grade witness credibility. See, e.g.,

JOHN

M.

A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 180 (1957) (addressing "truthfulM. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 183 (1921) (discussing
"credibility" and "reliability"); S.L. Zabell, The ProbabilisticAnalysis of TestiKEYNES,
ness"); JOHN

mony, 20 J. STATISTICAL PLANNING & INFERENCE 327, 332 (1988) (discussing

"credibility" and "veracity"). However, to use numbers on [0,1] single
probability scales to grade credibility is asking more of single numbers than
they can deliver. The basic difficulty is that a single number does not take
into account the fact that assessments of credibility involve chains of reasoning
or that there must be more than one probability involved in credibility assessment. Epistemologists as well as probabilists have failed to appreciate the importance of source uncertainty. Some epistemologists assert that knowledge
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ent purposes, it is convenient to ignore the ultimate hypothesis
or fact in issue H.) If it is assumed that the probative force of
the report of E is affected by these three behavioral attributes,
the diagram in Figure 3 demonstrates that the credibility of any
witness is a characteristic that is affected by several distinct behavioral attributes; that is, credibility is a "multi-attribute
characteristic."
The first link at the bottom of the chain in Figure 3 represents veracity assessment. The presence of this link in the
chain reflects our own judgment that people do not always tell
us what they believe. The arrow from E* to Eb indicates that
the witness's statement E is inconclusive evidence of her belief
that E happened.
The second link from the bottom represents an objectivity
assessment or judgment. This link in the chain reflects our
judgment that people sometimes disbelieve or misinterpret the
evidence that their senses provide. For example, we may think
that if the witness expected event E to happen or wished that it
had happened (or wishes that it had happened), then the witness will believe that event E happened regardless of what her
senses recorded. The arrow in the second link of the chain, like
the arrow in the first link, represents inconclusive evidence. In
this case, the arrow indicates our opinion that a witness's belief
that an event E did or did not happen is by itself inconclusive
evidence of what the witness's sensory organs actually
recorded.
The third link from the bottom of the chain represents "accuracy of sensory evidence." It exists because a person's sensory evidence is not always accurate. Human sensory
modalities are not infallible under the best of conditions. The
conditions under which observations are made may prevent
otherwise well-functioning sensory organs from working effectively. Hence, even if a witness's senses give evidence of event
E, this sensory evidence still is only inconclusive evidence that
consists of "justified true belief." On this view, a person has knowledge of an
event E if and only if three conditions are satisfied: (i) E did happen, (ii) the
person believes E happened, and (iii) the person is justified in believing that E
happened. This definition of knowledge, which is called the "standard analysis," contains important insights, but it ignores the possibility that witnesses
who lack justification for believing E may nevertheless furnish evidence of E.
See Schum, supra note 15, at 42; cf BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF
PHILosoPHY 131-40 (1912) (criticizing the standard analysis); Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYsIs 121, 121-23 (1963)
(same); Colin Radford, Knowledge-By Examples, 27 ANALYSIS 1, 1-11 (1966)
(same).
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E did in fact happen. Thus, Figure 3 illustrates that a person
who evaluates a testimonial assertion of a witness has at least
three potential sources of uncertainty 17 when deciding whether
to believe an event E occured.18
Additional testimonial attributes easily can be incorporated
into diagrams such as the one shown in Figure 3. Consider Figure 4. Unlike Figure 3, Figure 4 accommodates possible uncertainty about the intended meaning of an assertion by a witness.
(Read Ec as "not-E", H0 as "not-H", etc.) Figure 4 therefore
speaks to the ability of a witness to "narrate," i.e., to use language to communicate meaning. In particular, Figure 4 recognizes the possibility that a witness, by uttering certain words,
may have meant to assert either E or E; i.e., it is possible that
the report is either E* or (E)*. Further modifications in the
ingredients of argument about credibility can be made as necessary. For example, although the argument shown in Figure 4
partitions the possible intended meanings of the witness into
two disjoint and exhaustive hypotheses, the possibilities may be
17. We do not list "memory" as a separate testimonial attribute. This
omission is deliberate. In our schema questions about the memory of a witness
often bear on the "objectivity" of the witness. (One might also argue, however, that memory goes to the question of the accuracy of a witness's perceptual processes.)
18. Figure 3 may not depict all of the testimonial attributes that are
thought to be relevant in arguments about credibility. For example, the ability
of a witness to "narrate" may be relevant to the witness's credibility, but Figure 3 does not represent this behavioral characteristic. It is therefore entirely
possible that Figure 3 may have to be modified to take into account additional
hearsay dangers and testimonial qualities. This possibility does not surprise or
disturb us. There is no "magic" in the picture of the ingredients of credibility
assessment given by Figure 3 or by any similar diagram or chart. Diagrams
like Figure 3 are only representations of thinking. The specific ingredients of
these diagrams depend on the judgment of the people who make such representations; the judgment of the maker of an argument about credibility determines which attributes of a witness are relevant to credibility. Judgments of
this sort are subjective and inevitably will differ. Because of this, some students of inference, in all likelihood, will think that the the list of credibility
attributes in Figure 3 is incomplete or that it needs to be restructured.
Despite inevitable disagreements about the identity of relevant testimonial attributes, our methods of portraying the influence of testimonial attributes on judgments about credibility and probative value are useful. From a
formal point of view, the significance of Figure 3 does not depend on the character or number of the testimonial attributes that it incorporates. While the
choice of the attributes incorporated into Figure 3 is not unimportant from a
normative or descriptive point of view, the significance of Figure 3 from a formal point of view lies in what it reveals about the structure of arguments regarding credibility that have, as their ingredients, two or more testimonial
attributes.
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{H , He)

T
{E, EO}

{E., Ec}

{Eb, Eb}

T
{E* Me

}

T
TC
TC = Testimonial Conduct

SFIGURE 4I

[Vol. 76:813

1992]

HEARSAY LOGIC

defined in a different way if that is thought to be useful or
necessary.' 9
B. THE VARiATiVE NATURE OF ARGUMENT ABOUT
TESTIMONIAL AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE

The assumption that the argument about credibility and
the probative force of testimonial evidence is affected by judgments about several behavioral attributes of witnesses, such as
veracity and sensory ability, has a number of important iinplications. Among the most important is the notion that one can
reach the same conclusion about the credibility of a witness by
a variety of argument routes. Another is that the testimony of
witnesses with "defective" testimonial credentials can have substantial probative value. A third implication is that the number
of inferential arguments increases exponentially as the number
of testimonial attributes increases.
1.

Simple Testimonial Evidence: 2' = 8 Paths to Probable
Truth

The inference diagram in Figure 4 seems to suggest that
there is one path from a testimonial report to a hypothesis.
The path from a report to an hypotheses has a number of links,
but it seems to be a single path. This impression is misleading.
To create the conditions that will allow any kind of inference
engine to run, it must be assumed that evidence may support
alternative hypotheses. Each of the nodes or links in a chain of
reasoning involves classes of events. In many situations, it is
convenient to suppose that the classes of events are binary
event classes such as JE,Ec}. 20 If this assumption is made, a
three-stage credibility argument takes the form shown in Figure 5.
19. It is possible that the "testimonial conduct" of a witness was meant to
assert neither E nor E. For example, in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 733
(1987), the victim of alleged sodomy testified about the defendant's use of his
"d-i-c-k." The Court noted that "there was some confusion as to whether [the
victim] knew what a 'd-i-c-k' was, although she spelled the word at trial." I&
at 733 n.4. To express what the child might have been trying to assert, the hypotheses about what she meant to say may have to be partitioned differently.
20. Remember, read Ec as "not-E," or the complement of E.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
E = Event or events
asserted by witness

I

[Vol. 76:813

E .E'I
Sensoryj

Es

[E s] C

Sensitivity

lObjectivitUl
{Eb

c
[Eb C

I

Iveracit y

Witness* Testimong

FIGURE 5
This refinement makes it apparent that there are multiple
paths from a report of an event to the conclusion that the event
did or did not occur. For example, E* can lead to either Eb
("witness believes that E happened") or [Eb]c ("witness does
not believe that E happened"); Eb can lead to either Es ("witness sensed evidence of E") or [E] c ("witness did not sense evidence of E"); and so on.
The argument structure shown in Figure 5 can be represented by the tree in Figure 6. This tree more palpably displays
the possible reasoning routes from the report E* to hypothesis
E. Inspection of the tree shows that if there are three relevant
testimonial qualities, there are eight possible ways to get from
"here" to "there"; for example, to go from a report E* to a hypothesis E or Ec.21
21. Because our present focus is on the effect of testimonial qualities on
the probability that a reported event E actually occurred, we can ignore H for
the time being.
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The Value of Liars and Other Unreliable Witnesses

The diagram in Figure 6 portrays various possible arguments or chains of inferences based on testimonial evidence.
Portions of this diagram may seem counterintuitive. For example, the line of argument denoted by the circled number seven
in Figure 6 indicates that the occurrence of an event E may be
inferred from a witness's report even though the finder of fact
believes that the witness is a liar and that the witness does not
interpret the information from her senses reliably. This may
seem paradoxical, but David Schum has shown that the paradox may be only apparent.2 2 Under certain assumptions, liars
and other unreliable witnesses can report the truth, albeit unwittingly or for reasons that they do not themselves understand
or accept.2s
At one time, the law apparently rejected the hypothesis
22. Schum, supra note 15, at 55.
23. Id. (arguing that a witness without "knowledge" may have probative
evidence, and showing that under certain assumptions the testimony of a witness having totally defective testimonial attributes may have probative value).
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that known liars and other unreliable witnesses can "tell" the
truth.24 Perhaps it did so by embracing the notion that a witness with defective testimonial capacities is utterly incapable of
telling the truth2 5 Correlatively, some historical evidence
seems to suggest that the law once supposed that witnesses fall
into two and only two categories: credible witnesses and incredible witnesses. The law now recognizes, however, that the
testimonial capacities of witnesses may be impaired by degrees.
It also acknowledges that the testimony of witnesses with partially defective testimonial capacities can contribute to the dis26
covery of the truth.
Whether the emergence of the modern legal approach to
testimonial evidence is attributable to a fundamental change in
conceptions of truth and probability we cannot say. We can say,
however, that modern law unquestionably treats testimonial
evidence probabilistically. The notion that proof is a matter of
degree and that evidence-including testimonial evidenceadds to truth by degrees, and only by degrees, now has the status of a truism.2 7 However, there is an interesting and important concomitant to the truism that all proof is a matter of
probability and degree. If testimonial evidence can be combined with other evidence to make a fact more probable than in
the presence of only a single item of testimonial evidence, it follows that truth is in the eye of the beholder of evidence-in
24. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830,
at 24-25 (1975) (noting that courts would bar potentially deceiving evidence
from going to the jury).
25. Id at 25-26 ("The [North American] colonial approach to evidentiary
questions rested in large part ... on a conception of truth that we do not
share. The conception-that truth would emerge not from a weighing of credibilities and probabilities, but from the sanctity of an oath-looked backward to
earlier times, in which God-fearing men had attached enormous importance to
a solemn oath."); cf SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 163-93 (arguing that there has
been a fundamental change in conceptions of truth and probability during the
last several centuries and tracing the emergence of the modern, probabilistic
conception of truth to several sectors of culture, including law). However, it is
not unreasonable to wonder if the difference between modern and medieval
conceptions of factual inference and proof has been exaggerated and overdrawn. See, e.g., Mirjan Damaka, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 425, 435-36 (1992) (describing a decidedly "modern" view of the dangers
of hearsay by the medieval Roman-canon law).
26. 2 WIGMORE, supranote 3, § 475, at 633-34 (arguing that witness competency rules generally are or should be determined by the relevance standard).
27. 1A WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 37.4, at 1030; see also FED. R. EvID. 401
(" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
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this case, the trier of fact--and not in the evidence that the
trier beholds. 2s This holds true even if the evidence that the
trier beholds is the testimony of a witness or the witness herself. The trier of fact is entitled to make more, or less, out of
the testimony of a witness than the witness does herself, and
the trier may give that testimony a vector that is the opposite
of that indicated by the witness. In short, the significance of
testimonial evidence lies in the eye of the beholder of the evidence. This principle implies that the testimony of a witness
with poor testimonial credentials can have substantial probative
value. It also implies the far more surprising proposition that
the beholder of testimonial evidence can draw an inference that
is the direct opposite of the witness's assertion.
The beholder of testimonial evidence must-or so we
think-attach significance to testimonial attributes when assessing the credibility of witnesses. It does not follow, however,
that the trier cannot infer anything of importance from the testimony of a person she thinks is a liar or has some other defect.
If the significance of evidence is in the eye of the beholder, it is
equally true that the testimonial attributes of witnesses are
themselves evidence for the trier of fact. The trier is entitled,
epistemologically and inferentially speaking, to use evidence
about those attributes to draw conclusions that the witness herself may not draw or may not want the trier to draw. Hence, it
is not surprising in principle that a trier of fact may rationally
use a testimonial assertion E* to conclude not-E. The real issue
is when a trier of fact may do so, not whether she may do so.
The proposition that liars and unreliable witnesses may report the truth has a flip side. The flip side is that honest and
reliable witnesses may report untruths. In older American
cases, it often was said that the testimony of a credible witness
must be taken as true.29 Similar statements still are made today.3 0 As a matter of epistemology and inferential theory, how28.

If, that is, testimonial evidence, like all other evidence, is a brick that

can be used with other bricks to build a wall. See McCoRMICK, supra note 5,
§ 185, at 543 (noting that "a brick is not a wall").
29. See pertinent cases gathered in Olin Guy Wellborn mI, Demeanor, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1101 n.127 (1991) (collecting cases).
30. Most courts today say that the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of a disinterested witness must be believed. Id. at 1100. The meaning of
this principle is unclear. Under one interpretation, it is practically a tautology:
the report of a perfect witness must be believed if no evidence apart from the
witness's testimony suggests anything other than the facts to which the witness attests. However, if the principle-whatever it may mean-is something
more than a tautology, the law does not, or should not, embrace it. No witness
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ever, the idea that the testimony of credible witnesses must
have probative value cannot readily survive. The reason is that
the trier of fact, not the witness, is the trier of fact. The value
of the testimony of an unimpeached witness, as well as the
value of the testimony of a witness with absolutely rotten testimonial credentials, depends on what is in the trier's mind. 31
The proposition that the testimony of a liar can point the
way to the truth is not counterintuitive. Consider the testimony of Worst Witness. Worst is a pathological liar. He also
has a "reading disorder" which sometimes causes him to make
a faulty substitution of letters. However, he does not know he
has a reading disorder. The mendacity of Worst Witness takes
a very specific form. Worst says X whenever he believes not-X,
and he says not-X whenever he believes X. Because of this
learning disorder, Worst reads the letter 'T'whenever the letter actually is "y," and he reads "y" whenever the letter is actually "i." Worst becomes a witness in a criminal trial. David
Defendant is charged with throwing lye on his ex-wife's face on
June 1, 1990. Independent evidence shows that on May 27,
1990, Worst said to Defendant, "Isn't that lye you just bought?";
in response, Defendant scribbled a note to Worst. The prosecutor authenticates this note and introduces it into evidence.
actually is perfectly credible; any real-world witness may have testimonial de-

fects, such as observational mistakes and memory lapses. Moreover, if the
trier of fact, not the witness, is entrusted with deciding facts, the trier is entitled to find some significance in the testimony of a highly credible witness that
the witness herself does not see. If the law says that a trier must believe an
unimpeached, uncontradicted, and seemingly disinterested witness, it does so
for some reason or reasons other than the supposition that such a witness is
perfectly credible.
31. Two versions of the theory that the testimony of liars may have probative value have been articulated. The less radical version asserts that the
testimony of a liar that event E occurred may offer significant support for the
inference that E did occur. The more radical version asserts that a liar's statement that E did not occur may offer significant support for the inference that
E did occur. One commentator has noted that "[h]undreds of cases" hold that
a jury may not infer event E on the basis of "disbelief" of the testimony of a
witness who asserts not-E. Wellborn, supra note 29, at 1101. Our analysis,
however, suggests that there is no fundamental distinction between the less
radical and the more radical version of the thesis that the testimony of liars
may have probative value. While a parsing of the "hundreds of cases" referred
to by Professor Wellborn is beyond the scope of this paper, we suspect that
careful inspection of those cases would show that, in specific circumstances,
the law will allow a trier of fact to infer E from testimony that is not-E. If so,
the "hundreds of cases" seemingly saying the opposite may turn on distinctions such as the one we later make between a testimonial assertion that rests
on personal knowledge and a testimonial assertion not based on personal observation. See infra part IV.D.
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However, part of the note-the right-hand portion-has been
ripped off. The words on the remaining portion of the note say,
"That's no." The prosecutor takes a shot in the dark and asks
Worst whether the next word in the note was originally
"L-I-E" or "L-Y-E." Worst answers, "L-I-E." Is the testimony
of this learning disabled liar probative? Now change the problem. First, suppose that Worst does not have a learning disorder. Second, suppose that in response to the prosecutor's
question, Worst states, "L-Y-E." Does the testimony of this
non-learning disabled liar have any probative value?
In both cases, Worst is a liar, but in both cases, Worst's testimony has affirmative probative value on the issue of Defendant's guilt. Although the reasons why the two answers have
probative value are different in each case, the answers by Worst
have probative force because of the evidence the trier has, and
the conclusions he reaches, about Worst's testimonial qualities.
In the first case, Worst's answer has probative value because
the trier believes that the result of the combination of pathological lying and learning disorder makes Worst unwittingly say
the truth. In the second case, Worst's answer has probative
value because the trier believes that Worst, being a special kind
of pathological liar, says "y" when he actually believes "i"; believing what he believes about Worst's proclivity to lie, the trier
infers that Worst believes "L-I-E" precisely because Worst asserted "L-Y-E." In this second case, the trier infers the opposite of what Worst asserts. However, in either version of the
problem, the trier acts rationally-given what he infers in each
case about Worst's testimonial attributes and the way he believes, or infers, that they interact.
The Worst Witness hypotheticals illustrate an important
consequence of the assumption that credibility is a multi-attribute characteristic. If judgments about the credibility of a witness are not irreducible, but depend on further or separate
judgments about at least several attributes or a witness, the relationship between credibility and testimonial capacities is not
necessarily or ordinarily direct. 32 The Worst Witness hypotheticals merely illustrate this basic point.33
32. See infra part IV.A.
33. If it is granted that the relationship between credibility and testimonial attributes is not direct and that the probative force of testimonial evidence
depends on a wide variety of circumstances, assumptions, and judgments, then
a legal rule that allows the use of hearsay evidence only when the testimonial

capacities of the hearsay declarant are shown to be strong results in something
of an inferential puzzle. Statements by a declarant with weak credibility cre-
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= 64 Paths to Probable Truth

We already have shown that, under certain assumptions,
there are eight possible argument routes to the probable truth
of a factual hypothesis and its complement.3 4 Inspection of Figure 6 also shows that the number of possible arguments based
on testimonial evidence grows exponentially as the number of
links in the chain of reasoning increases. In fact, the number of
possible arguments is 2n, where n represents the number of
links in the chain of reasoning.
Hearsay evidence involves an assessment of two human
sources of evidence instead of one. The length of the chain of
reasoning doubles when a trier assesses the probative force of
hearsay evidence. The trier must assess not only the testimonial qualities of the in-court witness but also the testimonial
qualities of the out-of-court declarant. If it is assumed that the
assessment of testimonial evidence involves three inferential
stages, the assessment of hearsay evidence consequently requires six links in the chain of inferences. This means that the
number of possible arguments about the probative force of
hearsay is 26, or 64.35 In fact, we shall show that the number of
possible arguments based on hearsay evidence often greatly exceeds 64. The complexity of argument about hearsay raises the
question of the practical and cognitive manageability of argument about hearsay evidence. We shall discuss this question in
the last part of this paper after we have more fully illustrated
the complexity and intricacy of "hearsay logic."

IV. A BAYESIAN PERSPECTIVE ON HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
We have shown that chains of argument involving out-ofcourt utterances can assume a variety of shapes. Now we wish
to see if probability theory can clarify some of the features of
dentials may have substantial probative value; statements by a declarant with
strong credibility credentials may have little probative value; and assertions by
witnesses possibly may even support the opposite of what they assert. If this is
true, is it possible to explain or defend the hearsay rule on the basis of inferential considerations? This question deserves more space than we can devote
to it here.
34. This holds if judgments about credibility are assumed to involve inferences about three separate testimonial qualities that work in combination to
affect the credibility of a witness.
35. If we assume, as the law does, that the number of relevant testimonial
qualities is four rather than three, the number of possible arguments about
hearsay is 28, or 256.
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those various patterns of argument. We begin not with the
most complex forms of argument concerning hearsay but with
the most simple. We first examine an inferential argument
that takes the form of a single chain. In this kind of argument,
each link in the argument is connected to only one other link.
In visual terms, the pattern of argument takes the form of a
single vertical chain of inferences.
A. LIKELIHOOD ExPREssIoNs IN HIERARCHICAL INFERENCE

From a Bayesian perspective, the probative force of an
event is a function of two conditional probabilities, P(EIH) and
P(EIHC). The term P(EIH) represents "the probability of E
given H"; and P(EIH), "the probability of E given not-H." Consider an illustration. Suppose E represents "David Defendant's
escape from jail" and H represents "David Defendant killed
Sam Smith." Suppose that we somehow know that David Defendant escaped from jail. The term P(EIH) asks for a judgment about the probability of David Defendant's escape from
jail if David Defendant killed Sam Smith. The term P(EIH0 )
asks for a judgment about the probability of Defendant's escape
from jail given the assumption that David Defendant did not
kill Sam Smith. Bayesian theory instructs us that the more the
two terms P(EIH) and P(EIHC) differ, the stronger the probative force of the known occurrence of event E is. Conversely, if
the probability of the evidence's existence is the same whether
the hypothesis is true or false, the event E is "worthless"
36
evidence.
Many standard accounts 37 of Bayesian analysis of evidence
assert that the probative impact of an event (e.g., "David Defendant's escape from jail") on another hypothesis (e.g., "David
Defendant killed Sam Smith") is given by the likelihood ratio:
P(EIH)
LE=p(EIHP9
=

(1)

36. Formally expressed, this means that if P(EIH) = P(ElH0 ), any report
about event E, hearsay or otherwise, has no probative value. In the simple
hearsay case described below in part IV.B., this means that L for E* = 1.0.
For example, suppose that we have a hearsay report of a suspect's escape from
jail. If we believe that the probability of the suspect's escape from jail was the
same whether he was guilty or whether he was innocent, the report of the suspect's escape cannot have any probative value on the question of guilt. One
might say in this instance that event E is not relevant in any way to the pro-

banda [H,HJ.
37. See, e.g., RIcHARD 0.

LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTzBuRG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 159 (2d ed. 1982); Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1042 (1975).
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One of the advantages of this likelihood expression is its simplicity. Another is that it does not require a determination of
the individual values of P(EIH) and P(EHc); the ratio
P(EIH)/P(EIH) requires only a comparative judgment of the
probability of E under the alternative assumptions of H and H.
For example, if it is known that David Defendant escaped from
jail, the likelihood ratio for "David Defendant's escape from
jail" can be extracted without determining the magnitude of
the probability of Defendant's escape from jail if Defendant did
kill Sam Smith or the magnitude of the probability of his escape if he did not kill Sam Smith. This comparative judgment
merely requires a judgment of the comparative size of these
probabilities. Thus, if a judgment is made that Defendant's escape from jail was three times more probable if Defendant
killed Sam Smith than if he did not, this is sufficient. It is not
necessary to determine whether the probabilities of an escape
from jail under the alternative assumptions of guilt and innocence were .3 and .1, .9 and .3., or any other pair of specific
probabilities that maintains the ratio 3:1.
There is nothing "wrong" with the likelihood ratio
P(EH)/P(EHC), but it cannot be used to represent the probative force of circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, or
hearsay evidence. The ratio P(EH)/P(EHC) expresses the probative force of an event E on hypotheses [ H,HCJ only if event E
is known. It does not do so if the event E is uncertain. Of
course, the event E may, in fact, be uncertain. (For example,
although we have assumed that it is known that David Defendant escaped from jail, it may be uncertain whether he did so.)
An event E is uncertain whenever it is merely a possible inference. 38 If an event E is itself nothing more than a possible inI J
ference based on evidence, the probative force of E on [H,H
rests on a chain of inferences; i.e., the inferential reasoning
leading to E is "catenated," "cascaded," or "hierarchical."
Schum has shown that the probative force of an uncertain
38. More precisely stated, E may be a hypothesis rather than a known
event or fact. If the truth of E cannot be shown deductively, a judgment about
E must involve an inference. However, all inferences about factual hypotheses
are uncertain. We say this even though it is true that standard probability
theory allows the possibility of an utterly certain inference; formally speaking,
utterly certain inferences and utterly impossible inferences are merely special
cases of conditional probability. However, we refuse to call an utterly certain
inference a true inference about a factual hypothesis. A conclusion can be certain only if it is logically entailed by its premises. Factual inference involves a
type of inductive reasoning rather than deductive reasoning. An inductive inference is never certain.
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event E in a chain of inferences is affected
by the rareness, or
39
absolute improbability, of that event.
In the simple case we have posited, the probative force of
evidence E* about event E in an hierarchical inference structure is:
LE
P(EIH 1 )[h - f ] + f ,
(2)
P(EIH 2)[h2 - f2] + f 2
In this equation, H1 and H 2 are any two disjoint hypotheses.
Assuming conditional independence of E*, and JH1, H2 1
conditional upon E or E', Equation 1 may be written thus:
IL* = P(EIH)[h - f ] + f
P(EIH 2)[h - f] + f
(2a)
Equations 2 and 2a make use of the terms 'h" and "f." These
terms are borrowed from signal detection theory. The symbols
h and f are conditional probabilities. The term h corresponds to
P(E*IE), and the term f corresponds to P(E*IE). The symbol h
thus represents a "hit," or "the probability of a hit"; i.e., the
probability of testimony E* when E is true. The symbol f represents "the probability of a false positive"; i.e., the probability
of testimony E* when E is not true. Roughly speaking, then, a
signal has probative value if h and f differ. When h = f, then
testimony E* has no probative value.
Equations 2 and 2a show that in the context of hierarchical
inference-which is to say, in almost every real-world inferential context-the probative value of an event does not depend
solely on the ratios between hits and false positives. Another
way to express equation 2a is:
L E* =

P(EIH) [h - f] + f
P(EIH') [h - f] + f

=

P(EH) 4- Eh/f - 11-1

P(EIH') + [h/f - 1]-1

(2b)

Equation 2b shows that, in multistage inferential argument, the

value of LE*-i.e., the probative value of testimony E*-is determined by the difference between P(EIH) and P(EIH0 ) and
not simply their ratio. 4° For example, consider the following
two pairs of conditional probability judgments:
(a) P(EIH) = 0.9; P(EIHC) = 0.09
(b) P(EIH) = 0.09; P(EIH0 ) = 0.009
39. Alternatively stated, in hierarchical inference, we need the individual

likelihoods P(EIH) and P(EH) and not just their ratios. See, e.g., Ward Edwards et al., Murder and (o?)the Likelihood Principle: A Trialogue, 3 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 75, 77 (1990).
40. Id.
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Under Equation 1 in both of these cases, LE = P(EIH)/P(EIH)
= 10; i.e., the likelihood ratio is the same. But Equation 2b,
which gives the likelihood ratio for the probative force of testimony E* about event E, shows that the probative value of E* is
not the same in the two cases if E is an inferred or reported
(and therefore uncertain) event. The reason is that, in case (b),
event E is improbable whether we assume H or assume H ; i.e.,
it is a rare event. Although cases (a) and (b) produce the same
ratio-10/1-the difference between P(EIH) and P(EIH ) is not
the same in the two cases. In case (a), the difference is 0.81,
and in case (b), it is 0.081.
In non-hierarchical inference, the relevant likelihood judgment depends only on an assessment of the ratio between
P(EIH) and P(EIHC). Hence, it is not necessary to determine
the individual values of P(EIH) and P(EIH); it is only necessary
to determine the ratio between these two conditional probabilities. However, in hierarchical inference, it is necessary to establish the differences between P(EIH) and P(EIH0 ) and not
merely their ratios. Thus, it is necessary to have the individual
values of P(EIH) and P(EH); that is, it is necessary to make
judgments about the rareness, or improbability, of E given H
and, alternatively, given Hc. The simple ratio LE P(EIH)/P(EIH ) suppresses the rareness of E under those two
conditions and therefore does not display the differences between the rareness of E under H and the rareness of E under
H. Note that in the special case that determines equations 2a
and 2b, we need only the ratio h/f.
B.

HEARSAY LOGIC AS A THREE-STAGE ARGUMENT

1.

The Probative Value and Credibility of Hearsay Evidence

Figure 7 represents the simplest imaginable hearsay problem for three reasons. First, there is a single out-of-court declarant, or primary witness, W 1, and there is a single in-court
declarant, or secondary witness, W 2.41 Second, the reasoning
stages shown in Figure 7 are in their undecomposed form; that
is, the pattern of inference shown ignores matters such as veracity, objectivity, sensory sensitivity, and ability to use language. Finally, there are no direct links between event classes
and "ultimate facts in issue"; that is, intermediate hypotheses
41. This assumes that a courtroom witness's report of his own statement
is not "true" hearsay. In this Article, we do not discuss the issue of prior statements by testifying witnesses.
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are relevant to the hypothesis tH,HC1 only by the argument
shown in Figure 7, and by no other chain of inferences.
{H, HcI
{E, Ec}

{E* 1 ,E*c}

H is some probandum.
E is some event that is probative of H or HC.
E* I is the assertion by out-of-court declarant
or Primary Witness W, that event E happened.
Read E*c as "WI did not assert that E happened."
This covers two possibilities: (1) WI asserted that Edid not
happen, and (2) Wj made no assertion at all.

E 2,1

W2 is the in-court declarant or Secondary Witness.
Read E*
as "W2 asserts that W, asserted that
2,1
event E occurred."

I FIGURE7
According to Bayes' Rule, the probative value of E*z on
[HHl ] is given by the likelihood ratio in Equation 3 in the box
in Figure 8; i.e., the value of L*1 is the probative value of a
report by a courtroom witness of a statement allegedly made by
another person.
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EQUATION 3
-1

L
E2, I

P(EIH)

+

C

P(EIHO ) + C

whereC+
e
w

i-

I~f

(hi

fI

Read: hi = P(E* 1 IE) as "the probability that Primary Witness Wi
told Secondary Witness W2 that E occurred, if E actually
occurred"
f = P(E* IE0 ) as "the probability that Primary Witness W1
told Secondary Witness W2 that E occurred, if E
actually did not occur"
h2 = P(E*21I E* ) as "the probability that W, tells us that
W2 said that E occurred, if W2 actually did so"
f 2 = P(E* 2 ,1 I E*1c ) as "the probability that W2 tells us that

that W, said that E occurred if (i)WI said that E did not
occur, or (ii)W, said nothing at all [i.e., W2 made up this
assertion] "

I[F IG U R E 8
The probative force of the testimony of a witness differs
from the credibility of a witness. For example, if a witness
with golden testimonial credentials testifies about an event that
is strongly probative of H, his testimony has greater probative
value than if he testifies to an event that only weakly supports
H. The probative force of the evidence shown in Figure 8 is
given by LE*2,1. The credibility of W and W 2 taken separately is
given by the ratios h1 /fl and h 2/f 2, respectively. The term C in
Equation 3 captures the aggregate credibility of both witnesses
in our problem, the courtroom witness W 2 and the hearsay de42
clarant W 1.

42. C's representation of their aggregate credibility thus illustrates that
the value of hearsay rests upon the credibility of two interacting witnesses.
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Small values of C are associated with large aggregate testimonial credibility. The value of C depends on probabilities, but
is not itself a probability. C is defined outside of the [0,1] interval. As the aggregate credibility of two witnesses in a hearsay
chain increases, the probative value of hearsay evidence also
can increase. However, consider the following ratio in Equation
3:
P(EIH) + C
(3)
P(EIWP) + C
Inspection of this ratio shows that C acts as a "drag" on the
change of opinion because the greater the value of C, the more
the likelihood ratio approaches one (1). As it does so, the probative value of the hearsay evidence for the hypothesis H (or
for the hypothesis H c) decreases. Thus, if C is very large, the
probative value of the hearsay evidence is very small. If the aggregate credibility of the two witnesses is very substantial,C is
very small, and the probative
value of the hearsay evidence
43
therefore may be substantial.
Large values of C are inversely related to aggregate credibility of the two witnesses in our undecomposed hearsay problem because the value of C in Equation 3 is a function of the
two inverses" involving the terms h and f.45 Recall that h represents the "hits," and f, the "false positives." If the two witnesses in the hearsay problem are considered separately, their
credibility increases as their ratio of "hits" to "false positives"
increases; i.e., as the ratios h1 /f1 and h 2/f 2 increase. When the
credibility of these two witnesses (taken separately) becomes
very substantial-i.e., as the hit ratios hl/f1 and h2 /f 2 become
very large-the value of the terms involving the inverses of
43. When the aggregate credibility of the two witnesses is enormous, the
hearsay evidence may have substantial probative value for H. Strong aggregate credibility does not guarantee that hearsay evidence has substantial probative value. If E offers only weak support for H, all the aggregate credibility
in the world in support of E will not make the hearsay evidence provide strong
support for H.
44. The inverses are the terms that have [-1] attached to them. These
terms may also be expressed in the following way[(h/f) - i] - ' = 1/[(h/f) - 1]
The term on the left is nothing more than a convenient way of writing the
term on the right. Read the inverse operation as "the number one divided by
whatever term the inverse is applied to." (The inverse operation corresponds
to the properties of negative powers. For example, X = 1/X.)
45. The terms h and f both are conditional probabilities, and their limits
are therefore zero and one. By convention, no probability value can exceed 1
nor fall below 0.
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these ratios becomes very small; the value of C also becomes
small; and, if event E has strong probative force on fH,HI, the
hearsay evidence of E also has strong probative force.
A more formal way to consider the effect of large values of
C on the probative value of hearsay evidence is to consider
what happens to the terms with inverses as h -- > 1.0 and f --*

0.43 (read the arrow --* as "approaches"). As h and f approach
these limits, the ratio h/f -+ oo; i.e., the value of the ratio ap-

proaches infinity. This means that the value of the whole term
approaches zero. The probative value of the hearsay evidence
therefore approaches the simple ratio P(EIH)/P(EIH ).
The term C not only captures how much drag credibility
exerts on change of opinion about the "fact in issue" but also
has directional properties. C captures whether aggregate credibility judgments move opinion toward H or toward H. When C
is positive, the hearsay evidence will favor inferentially
whatever probandum E favors. For example, if E favors H over
Hc, a positive value of C will make the hearsay evidence favor
H over Hc. If C is negative, however, the hearsay evidence will
favor whatever hypothesis Ec favors. It is a characteristic of
Bayesian inference that if E favors H over H', E must favor Hc
over H. Consequently, negative values of C mean that the
hearsay evidence favors Hc over H. This conclusion may seem
unremarkable and, in a sense, it is. However, it is important to
recognize that it implies that a hearsay report E* may in fact
make E' rather than E more probable than it was previously. If
Ec favors H0 (rather than H), the hearsay report of E favors H0
even though the event E, if known, favors H. If this conclusion
is not counterintuitive, it is interesting, and we have more to
say about it below in section 4.
2. The Credibility of the Hearsay Declarant
Consider the definition of the terms h, = P(E*1jE) and f=
P(E*iE) in Equation 3 in Figure 8. These two terms are conditional probabilities. They refer to the likelihood of the primary
witness (the hearsay declarant) telling the secondary witness
(the courtroom witness) that E happened if, respectively, E did
occur and E did not occur. Recall that the term E*1 represents
the report by the primary witness to the secondary witness that
E happened. Consequently, the terms h1 and f, concern the
credibility of W, when making the statement perceived by

W 2 .46

46. This means, of course, that any assessment of Wl's credibility involves
an assessment of the attributes of veracity, objectivity, and sensory sensitivity,
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Next, we must consider how the ingredients hi = P(E*1jE) and
fi= P(E*IE') affect the term C.
First, suppose that W1 is truthful, objective, and accurate in
his account of event E to W2. If so, then we would expect hi =
P(E*iIE) > fi = P(E*IIE') by an amount indicated by the
strength of our beliefs about these credibility attributes for W 1.
To the extent that we have reasons to doubt any attribute of
W1 's credibility, then either (a) hi > fl by a small amount or
(b) f1 = P(E*1E) > hi = P(E*iIE). For example, if we had reason to believe that W1 lied to W2 in telling him about E, then f,
> hl. As h, gets larger relative to fl, C gets smaller; i.e., the
more credible we believe Wi to be, the smaller the term involving h, and f, becomes.
Second, suppose that we think that W1 is not a credible witness; i.e., suppose that we believe that fi > hi. If the size of f,
increases relative to hl, the term involving hi and fi in C becomes negative in value and approaches the value (-1). When
C = -1, then E*2i favors H, not H. Taken by itself, therefore,
the statement of Wi depresses the probative significance of the
event she was said to have reported.
In the third scenario, the values of hi and fi get close together. This scenario produces some interesting results. First,
suppose h, = 0.45 and f. = 0.44. Their ratio is 45/44 = 1.023.
Now [1.023- 1]-1 = 1/(0.023) = 43.48. This adds considerable

inferential drag to term C and makes the hearsay evidence almost entirely worthless. Now reverse the values of hi and fl;
i.e., suppose h, = 0.44 and f1 = 0.45. Their ratio now is 0.978,
and, therefore, the term takes the value [0.978- 1]-' =
1/(-0.022) = -45.454. This negative term added into C also
produces a large amount of inferential drag.
These results suggest that if the hit rate and the false positive rate for the primary witness (W1 ) are close together-i.e., if
hits and misses are approximately the same- the primary witness's statement to the secondary witness has little probative
value. This conclusion is intuitive. If the primary witness's report to the secondary witness was as likely if E happened as if
it did not, then the secondary witness's report of E to us cannot
have much value.
or accuracy of perception. In part IV.D., infra, we decompose the terms
P(E*11E) and P(E*IEc) to incorporate these credibility attributes. At this
point, we consider the values h, = P(E*iIE) and fl= P(E*IE) only in their
undecomposed form.
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3. The Credibility of the Courtroom Witness
Examine Equation 3 in Figure 8 again. Consider the inverse term involving h 2 and f 2. By definition, h 2 = P(E* [E*,),
and f 2 = P(E*2,1IE*ic). The terms h 2 and f 2 involve the credibility of the secondary witness, the courtroom witness. 47 Our conclusions about the effect on C of the inverse term involving the
primary witness's hit rate and false positive rate (i.e., h1 and fl)
also apply to the effect of the inverse term involving the secondary witness's hits and false positives (i.e., h 2 and f 2). When h 2
is large relative to f2, this term adds very little to C. When ha2
and f2 are close together in value, the term adds a lot to C.
When f 2 is large relative to h 2, a negative amount is added to C.
4. The Probative Value of Improbable Hearsay Declarations
We already have examined the impact of event rareness on
the probative value of testimonial evidence. This problem now
receives a different articulation. Consider the term (h1 - fl).
The ingredients of this term refer to the hit and false positive
rate of the primary witness, or hearsay declarant. Within term
C, there are two types of terms that involve the ingredients h
and fl. One of them involves the ratio (h1 /f1 ). The other involves the difference (h, - fl). Recall that ratios suppress rareness but that differences capture it. Observe that the inverse
term involving h 2 and f2 is divided by the difference term involving h, and fl. This indicates that the credibility of the
courtroom witness W2 is weighted in a certain manner by the
credibility of the hearsay declarant W1. Hence, the credibility
of the witnesses interact in a testimonial chain. Bayes' Rule
portrays this interaction in a specific and interesting way.
Suppose that the courtroom witness W2 is a marvel of credibility; i.e., we believe that h 2 = 0.99 and f 2 = 0.01. In this case
the inverse term has the value 1/98 = 0.010. Now suppose that
while we believe that the probability of hits is much greater in
the case of the hearsay declarant W 1, we also believe that, in
the hearsay declarant's case, the probability of either hits or
false positives is very low; i.e., while we believe that the hearsay declarant is much more likely to score a hit than a false
positive, we also believe that she is not very likely to score
either a hit or a false positive. Hence, suppose that h = 0.090
and fl = 0.001.
47. When assessing h 2 and f 2 for W 2, we would want to consider the veracity of W 2 and his other relevant testimonial attributes. For the time being,
however, we are ignoring the ingredients of judgments about credibility.
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The ratio of h, and f, is now 90/1. However, their difference is only 0.089. This means that we believe that W1's report
to W 2 is a rare event, or, alternatively, that it is inherently very
improbable. W. is certainly credible, but for some reason we
cannot see him telling W2 that E occurred, whether or not it occurred. If 1/98 (for W 2) is divided by 0.089 (for W1), the result is
0.112, which gets added to C. This addition to C goes a long way
toward destroying the value of the hearsay from the courtroom
witness W 2.

Consider some further variations.

First, suppose that

P(EIH) = 0.90 and P(EIHC) = 0.01. Thus, event E is very pro-

bative of H. If we know for sure that E happened, we could
move our opinion in the direction of H by a factor of 90:1. However, we only have W2's hearsay evidence that W, said that E
occurred. If we believe that h, = 0.090 and f, = 0.001, and that
h2 = 0.99 and f2 = 0.01, then C = 1/(90-1) + [1/(99-1)]/0.089
= 0.011 + 0.112 = 0.123. With this C value, we can calculate L
for E*2, 1 = [(0.90) + 0.123]/[0.01 + 0.123] = 1.023/0.133 = 7.69,
a value much smaller than L = 90. This is an interesting result. Here the courtroom witness is very credible; the hearsay
declarant also is very credible; and the event supposedly reported by the hearsay declarant has very substantial probative
value if it actually happened. Nonetheless, the hearsay evidence given by the courtroom witness W2 has smaller probative
value. The reason for the lack of punch in W2's testimony has
to do with rareness. The hearsay evidence has little probative
value because the hearsay declaration by W, is inherently very
improbable, or rare. The testimony by W, has little probative
value because the hearsay declaration by W2 is very improbable,
both if E did occur and if E did not occur.
5. Summary
Bayes' Rule says that judgments about the probative value
of hearsay evidence involve five ingredients when judgments
about the credibility of a single witness are treated as primitive-when, therefore, more discrete testimonial attributes such
as ability to perceive and veracity are ignored. The examples in
Table 1 illustrate how "hearsay logic" works when judgments
about credibility remain undecomposed.4 8
In all fourteen examples in Table 1, the reported event E is
probatively important; LE in each of these cases is 90/1. How48. When E is rare, however, W2's report offers less support for Ec. (Here,
L [rare] = 1/0.911 = 1.098, favoring H-).
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ever, alternative assumptions are made about the absolute
probability of the reported event E. Two following cases are
considered: (1) P(EIH) = 0.90 and P(EIH) = 0.01, i.e., E is not
a rare or improbable event; and (2) P(EIH) = 0.09 and P(EIH0 )
0.001, i.e., E is a rare, or improbable, event.
TABLE 1
Case

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

h1
0.999
0.0999
0.999
0.81
0.999
0.001
0.999
0.001
0.200
0.200
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.8

fl
0.001
0.0001
0.001
0.80
0.001
0.999
0.001
0.999
0.201
0.201
0.4
0.1
0.09
0.04

L [rare]

h2

f2

C

L

0.999
0.999
0.0999
0.999
0.81
0.999
0.001
0.001
0.7
0.200
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.8

0.001
0.001
0.0001
0.001
0.80
0.001
0.999
0.999
0.1
0.201
0.4
0.1
0.09
0.04

0.002
0.011
0.002
80.1
-81.16
-1.002
-1.002
0.002
-367.67
200,799.00
3.5
0.347
0.248
0.122

75.17
43.38
75.17
1.01
0.989
.103
.103
75.17
0.998
1.000
1.25
3.493
4.450
7.742

30.67
8.42
30.67
1.001
0.999
0.911
0.911
30.67
0.999
1.000
1.025
1.256
1.357
1.274

Columns 2-5 of Table I show the ingredients of C. The calculation of the value of C on the basis of these ingredients is
shown in Column 6. Column 7 shows the likelihood ratio for
W 2's hearsay testimony when E is not rare [L].

Column 8

shows the likelihood ratio for W 2's hearsay testimony when E is
rare [L rare].
Case 1 shows that hearsay testimony about event E from
two nearly perfect witnesses can have nearly the same probative significance as certain knowledge of event E-unless E is a
rare event. If E is a rare event, its probative force is reduced by
over half--even though the two witnesses in the hearsay chain
have very strong testimonial credentials. In Case 2, the out-ofcourt declarant W, is still very credible, but we believe his telling the courtroom declarant W 2 about event E is a rare event,
or very improbable. The improbability of W1 's statement to W2
reduces the value of W2's report of W1's statement in any case,
but the probative value of the hearsay declarant's (W1 's) report
is practically annihilated when we believe that the reported
event, E, also is rare.
Cases 11-14 show that the probative value of hearsay grows
gradually as the h/f ratio for each witness increases. The ratios
in these four cases are 2:1, 8:1, 10:1, and 20:1. The probative
value of the hearsay evidence does not increase in direct proportion to the increase in the h/f values. Thus, increases in the
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probative value of hearsay evidence are not directly proportional to increases in the credibility of the two witnesses taken
separately.
The next group of cases illustrates how the probative value
of hearsay evidence is weakened when the hits and false positives for one or both witnesses are about the same; i.e., when
one or both of the witnesses is about as likely to say that something happened when it did not happen as when it did. In Case
4, the hearsay declarant W2 is almost equally likely to tell the
courtroom witness W 2 that E happened whether it did or not.
This destroys the probative value of the hearsay evidence. The
rareness of E is immaterial. In Case 9, the hearsay declarant
W1 again is almost as likely to tell W2 that E occurred when it
did not in fact occur as he is to say that E occurred when it did
occur, but here the courtroom witness is moderately credible.
The result is essentially the same as in Case 4: the value of the
hearsay is destroyed. In Case 5, the hearsay declarant, W 1, is
extremely credible, but we believe it is extremely probable that
W 2 would report the hearsay statement whether or not he actually received a report from W 1. This almost annihilates the probative value of this hearsay. The rareness of E again is
immaterial. In Case 10, both witnesses are almost as likely to
make their reports if the events they reported did not occur as
they are if the events they reported did occur. The result is
that the hearsay evidence has almost no probative value. Once
again, it is immaterial whether the event E is rare.
The results in the foregoing cases probably conform to
common intuition. The results in the next three cases, however, are less obvious and challenge both intuition and Bayesian
theory. All of these cases involve reverse inferential spin; i.e.,
they involve situations in which a report of E strengthens the
inference Ec, or not-E. In Case 6, the courtroom witness W 2 is
very credible, but the hearsay declarant W 1 is a liar. Bayes'
Rule says that W 2's report offers some support for E' rather
than E. (The value L = 0.103 means that the hearsay report
favors Hc in the ratio 1/0.103 = 9.708). In Case 7, the courtroom witness W 2 is a liar, and the hearsay declarant Wi is a
saint. The probative force of the hearsay evidence is the same
as in Case 6.
Case 8 is the most interesting of the lot. The hearsay declarant Wi and the courtroom witness W2 both are liars. The
values of h1 and fi say that the hearsay declarant Wi is 999
times more likely to tell the courtroom witness W 2 that E happened if E did not happen than if it did. The values of h 2 and f2
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say that the courtroom witness W 2 is 999 times more likely to
tell the trier of fact that the hearsay declarant W, asserted E
when W, did not assert E than when W1 did, in fact, assert E.
The striking result of these assumptions is that the hearsay evidence in this case has as much probative value as it does in
Case 1 where the credibility of both the courtroom witness and
the hearsay declarant is very good. Can it be that the hearsay
evidence in Case 8 has substantial probative force even though
both the hearsay declarant and the courtroom witness are liars,
and can it be that the hearsay evidence can be just as probative
as it is when they are both saints? Or is Case 8 an anomaly that
demonstrates that there is something wrong with a Bayesian
interpretation of hearsay logic?
A distinction can be made that partially obviates the apparent anomaly in Case 8. E*1c is the event that W, did not report
E to W 2. This means either that (a) W, told W 2 that E did not
happen, or (b) W, did not say anything at all to W 2. In situation
(a), Bayes' Rule makes perfect sense. If W 2 is lying, W, told
him that E did not occur. If, in turn, W, is lying, E did occur.
As our earlier discussion of testimonial credibility implies, we
can believe E even though both witnesses are lying.
Suppose, however, that W, did not say anything about E to
W 2. How can we assign a large probative value to a hearsay report about E that W 2 made up? In this case, W 2 has put words
into W 1's mouth. It seems that a Bayesian interpretation of the
probative value of hearsay evidence produces an anomaly after
all. The anomaly is partly real, but it also is partly apparent because missing evidence still is evidence; i.e., Wl's failure to say
anything to W 2 may be probative in and of itself. Under the axioms of conventional probability theory, if P(E*iIE) = 0.001,
then P(E*IcIE) = 0.999. If E is "Wl's failure to say anything
about E to W 2", the probability of W 1's not telling W 2 that E
happened, if E did happen, is 0.999. Thus, it is possible that E
happened without W, telling W2 about it. Furthermore, ancillary evidence may support the judgment that there is a high
probability that W, would withhold evidence about E from W 2
if event E did occur.
Although missing evidence may have evidentiary value, it
is still difficult to accept giving strong probative value to a hearsay statement that the courtroom witness simply "made up."
The two-liars hearsay problem shows the need for further refinement of the Bayesian interpretation of testimonial and
hearsay evidence that we have presented. Specifically, the twoliars problem highlights our assumption that a signal has been
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received. The absence of an information-carrying signal-i.e.,
the absence of any relevant observation by a witness-is not
probative of H,H J. It is obviously possible that no signal was
received, or that no relevant observation was made.
When evaluating testimonial or hearsay evidence, it is
clearly important to take into account any significant uncertainty about whether a relevant observation was made. No inherent obstacle prevents the accommodation of this uncertainty
in a Bayesian framework, and, later in this Article, we shall
make some suggestions about how this might be accomplished.4 9 Moreover, even in the absence of further analytical
refinement, the two-liars hearsay problem is instructive. The
solution of the problem in Case 8 holds; if the judgment is
made that an information-carrying signal was indeed sent and
received, a trier of fact may believe not-E, and therefore, not-H.
This is true even though E by itself supports H and the courtroom witness reports that the hearsay declarant said E. Bayesian analysis thus confirms the epistemological point we made
earlier. A trier of fact can and should give her own "twist" to
any testimonial evidence she sees. Testimonial evidence can
and should be viewed as an event. A testimonial event may
have an inferential and probative significance for the trier of
fact that it does not have or was not intended to have by the
actors who made the testimonial event happen.
The discussion of testimonial attributes in the next section
further decomposes the factors that influence judgments about
whether and how far a decision maker should infer E on the
basis of a report of E c. However, the point that a trier of fact
can and should give her own "twist" to a testimonial report
when she believes that she has observed a relevant signal remains both valid and fundamental. This principle holds as long
as the law expects the trier of fact to use her own judgment
about the evidence she observes rather than simply accept the
judgments of the witnesses she sees and hears.
C. HEARSAY AND CONDITIONAL NONINDEPENDENCE
All of our formal discussions of hearsay logic in this part of
the Article have addressed only a single series of inferences
about hearsay evidence. Now, however, we consider cases in
which credibility-relevant attributes and behavior of a witness
49. The possibility of the absence of an information-carrying signal may
be accommodated by a more refined partition of the event classes in a hearsay
inference structure. See infra part IV.D.
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are directly connected with the fact or facts in issue. Figure 9
portrays three such cases. In the parlance of Bayesian theory,
the three cases in Figure 9 are instances in which the inference
structure is characterized by conditional nonindependence.
Conditional nonindependence is an interesting and important
phenomenon. When conditional independence holds, the probative value of the hearsay from the courtroom witness never
can exceed that of the known occurrence of an event E reported by a witness. When conditional nonindependence occurs, however, there can be more probative value in the
hearsay than there is in the event asserted by a hearsay declarant. In fact, when there is conditional nonindependence, the
likelihood ratio for testimony has no bounds; it can go to infinity in one direction and zero in the other. (Remember that a
zero likelihood ratio means that the testimony is conclusive on
Hc). The reason for these seemingly odd phenomena is that the
credibility-relevant behavior of the secondary source is itself
probatively significant.
Figure 9 contains several examples of conditional
nonindependence in reasoning chains involving hearsay evidence. In the case shown in Figure 9-A, the testimony of the
courtroom witness is conditional upon ultimate probanda
[H,HCI as well as upon (E*I,E*lc), the assertion or absence of an
assertion by the hearsay declarant.
The conditional
nonindependence involved here concerns the fact that either or
both of the following inequalities hold: (i) P[E*2ZE*l & H] =
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P[E*ziIE*d], and (ii) P[E*2,IIE*l & H] 5 P[E*2 ,IE*d. In short,
the courtroom witness' testimony depends not only upon what
the hearsay declarant said (or didn't say), but also upon
whether H or HC is true. For example, suppose H represents
"guilty," and HC, "innocent." The h and f values assigned to the
courtroom witness's testimony depend to some degree on
whether the defendant's innocence is assumed.
We might conclude that the courtroom witness's credibility
is affected by the facts in issue-H or H-if
we believe that the
courtroom witness knows more than he is telling us; i.e., if he
has acquired some knowledge about H or H but is not explicitly disclosing that knowledge. Indeed, the courtroom witness
might know whether H is true. Although the courtroom witness is not explicitly disclosing his knowledge of H and Hc, we
may be able to infer something about the facts in issue from the
behavior of the courtroom witness.
Figure 9-B depicts a situation in which the credibility-relevant behavior of the hearsay declarant is conditional not only
upon whether event E occurred-i.e., the event she allegedly
reported to the courtroom witness-but also upon whether H is
true. Here we have one or both of the following inequalities
holding- (i) P[E*1E & H] # P[E*iIE], and (ii) P[E*iIE & HI] #
P[E*iIE]. The third case is shown in Figure 9-C. In that case,
the credibility-relevant behavior of both witnesses is conditional upon H or H.- °
The box in Figure 10 shows an equation for the probative
force of hearsay where credibility is conditioned by H or He.51
The equation shown in Figure 10 has ten variables or parameters. In sensitivity analysis, some of these parameters are fixed
while others are varied, thereby showing how the equation
behaves in response to variation in its ingredient parameters.
Table 2 summarizes the results of one such "experiment."
50. Other patterns of conditional nonindependence are possible. These involve the events IEEC. The courtroom witness's credibility-relevant behavior
may be conditional upon whether or not event E occurrec This can happen in
addition to this witness's credibility-relevant behavior being conditional upon
H or He.
51. This equation takes credibility in its undecomposed form, and it ignores possible conditioning by E or E' of the credibility of the courtroom
witness.
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GENERAL EQUATION:
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TABLE 2
p1
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.09
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.09
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.09
.9
.9
.9

Ch

r

S1

t

P1

q2

.75
.75
.75
.75
.75
.075
.75
.75
.9
.01
.5
.5
.5
.25
.5
.9
.75
.9
.75
.75
.25
.25
.99
.25
.5

.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.001
.01
.01
.7
.75
.5
.5
.5
.24
.5
.9
.01
.9
.01
.01
.24
.24
.01
.24
.5

.99
.99
.99
.99
.01
.099
.9
.99
.99
.01
.001
.99
.99
.25
.99
.99
.9
.9
.99
.001
.001
.001
.99
.25
.99

.01
.01
.01
.01
.99
.001
.7
.01
.01
.99
.99
.01
.01
.24
.01
.01
.9
.9
.01
.0005
.0005
.0005
.01
.24
.01

.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.005
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.005
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.005
.05
.05
.05

.75
.74
.009
.009
.75
.075
.75
.75
.75
.75
.75
.75
.75
.75
.5
.9
.75
.75
.01
.75
.25
.25
.25
.99
.99

IE*zI

12.0
672.0
61.09
672.0
5.86
1.55
14.91
1/1.O5[H]
5.57
16.21
8.93
8.93
21.74
4.32
1.0
1.0
1.0
16.07
2.30
1/1082.8[H]
1/1197.0[H]
1/1206.5[IM
3.65
3.57
1.0

Some of the ingredients in the general equation in Figure
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10 are more interesting than others. For example, we already
know that the probative significance of the event asserted in
the hearsay is important in determining the probative significance of the hearsay testimony about this event. Hence, in Table 2, we have "fixed" the probative significance of event E, the
event reported in hearsay testimony by the courtroom witness.
In all of the examples in Table 2, event E has a likelihood ratio
of 18; i.e., event E is 18 times more probable under H than
under H. In every case, LE = P(EIH)/P(EIHC) = P1/P2 = 18,
but this ratio is obtained in two conditions: (i) when p, = 0.9
and

P2

= 0.05, and (ii) when pl = 0.09 and p2 = 0.005. In the

latter case, event E is a "rare" event. All other ingredients concern the credibility of the primary and secondary witnesses: q
and r ingredients are for the hearsay declarant, and s and t ingredients are for the secondary witness.
Although we cannot discuss all of the results shown in Table 2, we do wish to note that some of the results illustrate the
dramatic impact that conditional nonindependence can have on
the probative value of hearsay evidence. Consider Case 2. In
that case, both witnesses have good credibility credentials, but
the credibility of the courtroom witness is different under H
than it is under Hc. In fact, the courtroom witness is violently
biased against giving this testimony if Hc is true; i.e., his testimony is very improbable whether or not the primary source
told him that E happened. On these assumptions, LE* 2 ,l = 672.
Thus, hearsay under these conditions is 37 times more probatively valuable than knowing event E for sure!
Consider also Case 7. There the courtroom witness has a
bias conditional upon H. Recall that there are different kinds
of bias. Here the courtroom witness's hearsay testimony is very
probable whether or not the hearsay declarant reported the
event E to the courtroom witness; the courtroom witness's bias
is in favor of testifying that E happened. In this situation, LE*,1
= 14.91. Thus, the courtroom witness's testimony has a respectable degree of probative value. Normally a bias in favor of
giving testimony destroys its value. Here, however, the courtroom witness's testimony is conditional upon the hypotheses,
and it therefore acquires additional probative value.
Case 20 is both complex and curious. In Case 20, the courtroom witness has a strong bias against reporting the hearsay
when H is true, but the courtroom witness is biased in favor of
reporting the hearsay when H is not true. The result is a whopping likelihood ratio favoring H not being true, LE*2,1 =
1/1082.8. If we knew for sure that E did not occur, we would
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move our opinions in the direction of HC by a factor of 9.5.52
Hence, the hearsay in Case 20 has 1082.8/9.5 = 114 times more
probative value than knowing EC for sure. This result may
seem odd. But it is not. In Case 20, the behavior of the courtroom witness is probative. The probative value of the hearsay
is much greater than the known occurrence Ec simply because
the witness's behavior is extremely probative: we believe he
would very likely exhibit different types of behavior depending
upon whether we believe H or not-H to be true.

D.

HEARSAY AND TESTIMONIAL ATTRIBUTEs

We have not yet attempted a comprehensive Bayesian analysis of the relationship in hearsay argument between testimonial attributes, credibility, and probative value. 53 Thus, we
have no formal results to report for hearsay argument in which
credibility judgments are decomposed. We do have, however,
some further observations about the phenomenon of the value
of liars and other unreliable witnesses.
We indicated earlier that proper analysis of the testimony
of liars and unreliable witnesses requires a distinction between
witnesses who made a relevant observation and those who did
not. This distinction also must be incorporated into any formal
analysis of a testimonial chain that may include liars or other
kinds of unreliable witnesses; the possibility that the courtroom
witness W 2 did not observe a hearsay statement by the hearsay
declarant W1 must be taken into account. The inference tree in
Figure 11 shows how this distinction may be expressed.
Figure 12-A shows a fine-grained decomposition of hearsay
in terms of the testimonial attributes of both witnesses. The
reasoning chain shown in Figure 12-A is based on the binary
event classes that we used in earlier portions of this Article.
When the reasoning chain is modified to take into account the
possibility that no relevant observation was made either by W 2
or W1 or by both, the reasoning chain takes the form shown in
Figure 12-B.
V. HEARSAY HEURISTICS
Hearsay problems are subtle. Argument about hearsay eviWhen P(EIH) = 0.9 and P(EIH0 ) = 0.05, we know that LE = 18. And
= P(E0 IH)/P(E1H) =
P(EIH)]/[1 - P(E]H)] = 0.10/0.95 = 1/9.5, favoring H.

52.

LF-the probative value of knowing E for sure-is L
[1-

53. Our analysis of hearsay thus far deals only with undecomposed credibility judgments.
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E*2,1

NOTE:
E*1 = Primary witness told secondary
witness that event Eoccurred.
c
E *1 = Primary witness told secondary
witness that event Edid not occur.
01= Primary witness said nothing
about event Eto the secondary
witness.
FIGURE 11
dence depends on minute variations in detail, and minute
changes in hearsay evidence or the surrounding circumstances
can have a dramatic effect on argument about hearsay. Hearsay problems also are so complex that they threaten to outstrip
our capacity to calculate the probative force of even a single
real-world piece of hearsay evidence. The complexity of hearsay problems therefore presents a challenge to the goal of orderly and logical analysis of hearsay evidence.
Is it possible to conduct real-time analyses of real-world
hearsay problems? The answer is both "yes" and "no." The answer is "no" if the question is whether it is possible to dissect
and analyze every conceivable detail and nuance that may affect argument and judgment about hearsay evidence. The answer may be "yes" if we think of "analysis" of hearsay-i.e.,
orderly and explicit argument about hearsay-not as a procedure for mechanical solutions to our questions about hearsay,
but as a heuristic device for exploring, mapping, and checking
our own thinking about hearsay evidence. If we see analysis in
this latter mode, it may not be necessary to take into account
every detail that might have an effect on our judgments, but
only those details that seem important.
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IF1URE 12]
Nuances and details, however, do matter. Even if we limit
ourselves to the nuances and details that seem important, the
question remains whether we can consider them in an orderly
and logical way. It is important to frame this question in the
right way. If the question is, "Do we fully understand hearsay
logic?," the answer is clearly "no." This, however, is not the
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question we have in mind. The question we are asking is
whether it is useful to argue about hearsay evidence in an orderly and logical manner. In considering this question, it is important to remember that the alternative to orderly analysis of
hearsay problems is disorderly analysis of hearsay problems or
no analysis at all. It is hard to swallow the proposition that we
are better off if we do not reason about hearsay problems.
It is possible to reason in an orderly way about particular
parts or features of a hearsay problem, and it is possible to reason about a hearsay problem in an orderly way without pursuing or seeing all of the consequences of one's assumptions and
judgments. Logical analysis should not be thought of as a
machine that digests the ingredients of hearsay problems and
then spits out solutions, but as a tool that illuminates the
properties of our natural thinking more fully. If we trust our
natural thought processes, we need not despair that we do not
have the time or the ability to make fully explicit every feature
of our natural way of thinking about problems of evidence and
hearsay evidence. Our natural way of thinking about hearsay is
probably not so inappropriate. In any event, we have no satisfactory alternative to our natural, or ordinary, way of thinking
about hearsay. Orderly thinking may make our natural thinking work better.
Although incomplete logical argument about hearsay evidence is better than no argument at all, we have said little
about which heuristic strategy is appropriate for attacking
hearsay problems.5 We cannot say for sure what sort of strategy for the efficient deployment of cognitive resources is likely
to be most fruitful. We can say, however, that the law's strategy for dealing with hearsay is interesting and may have intrinsic heuristic merit.
To the extent that the hearsay rule is a rule for the organization of cognitive work, the hearsay rule requires that judges
and lawyers distinguish two types of out-of-court utterances.
The American law of evidence stipulates that out-of-court utterances are either hearsay or non-hearsay. It then proclaims
that if an out-of-court utterance is hearsay, the judge and the
lawyer must examine the testimonial credentials of the hearsay
declarant. American law also proclaims that if an out-of-court
54. It is important to have a strategy. Limitations of time and resources
force us to ignore some relevant features of the hearsay problem at hand while
attending to others, but it is important to attend to the set of features that is
more likely than another set in order to shed significant light on the problem
at hand.
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utterance is viewed as non-hearsay, the participants in the analytical process-the judge and the lawyers-must focus their attention on the way that the utterance connects with the fact or
facts in issue without regard to the credibility of the hearsay
declarant. This quite possibly is a sound way of organizing
scarce cognitive resources when the question of the admissibility of an out-of-court utterance arises.
The law's distinction between hearsay utterances and nonhearsay utterances parallels our own distinction between two
types of inferential claims: first, inferential chains whose base
consists only of judgments and arguments about credibility and
testimonial attributes, and second, inferential chains in which
there are "direct" or "lateral" links between utterances, credibility, or testimonial attributes and the fact or facts in issue.
The legal distinction between hearsay and non-hearsay thus
parallels a fundamental theoretical distinction. Of course, this
parallel does not in itself demonstrate that it is wise to use the
distinction to regulate the deployment of scarce cognitive resources in arguments about the admissibility and value of hearsay evidence. We went to some trouble, after all, to show that
testimonial attributes may be linked both "vertically" and "laterally" to facts in issue; e.g., testimonial attributes may be
linked to a fact in issue by the medium of credibility, and, at
the very same time, they may be linked directly to a fact in
issue.
In view of the possibility that a hearsay problem will involve both vertical and lateral reasoning chains, may anything
be said in favor of a procedure whereby an advocate begins
either with an analysis of a "vertical" link or with an analysis
of a "lateral" link, but not both together at once? We cannot
say for sure. We can say, however, that it is possible that
judges and lawyers somehow have an intuitive ability to see
when a potential hearsay problem depends primarily on judgments about credibility and testimonial attributes and when a
statement raises questions primarily about direct connections
between the facts in issue and out-of-court utterances or attributes of the witnesses.
If it is true that judges and lawyers have the intuitive ability to see when "hearsay is hearsay" and when apparent hearsay really is non-hearsay, the law's way of structuring the
deployment of cognitive resources may be efficient. Of course,
the use of this simplifying strategy exacts a price; it is always
possible that the intuition of the lawyer or the judge will be
wrong or that the probative value of an out-of-court utterance
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will indeed depend on both vertical and lateral links. However,
a price is exacted by any cognitive strategy. The question becomes, "How large is that cost in comparison with the benefits?" It is entirely possible that a "black-letter" approach to
the analysis of hearsay problems is an efficient strategy. In any
event, that seems to be the law's judgment. The occasional errors of black-letter classification of out-of-court utterances, it is
thought, are worth the cognitive economy achieved by the use
of coarse categorizations of different types of out-of-court
utterances.
Even if it is admitted that coarse classifications of hearsay
are necessary, it might be argued that the law's tacit substantive judgments about the worth or value of various categories of
out-of-court utterances are not justified. For example, it might
be argued that our own analysis suggests that the law errs in
supposing that hearsay statements are probative if and only if
at least some of the testimonial attributes of the hearsay declarant are shown to be (relatively) good. The law's proclamation
of such principles may, in fact, be in error. However, if the law
errs in making such stipulations about the treatment of hearsay
evidence, this cannot be extracted solely from the arguments
made in this Article. The hearsay logic that we describe does
not substantiate these or other conclusions about the rationality
of the law's treatment of hearsay evidence. At most, our analysis provides some of the necessary analytical machinery for
sound and informative argument about legal treatment of hearsay evidence. We reiterate that legal rules and principles that
place hearsay evidence into broad categories for purposes of adnissibility are not necessarily irrationals 5 It is true that legal
55. It may seem that our theory of hearsay logic implies that the adnissibility of hearsay evidence should be decided on an individual basis-that each

instance of hearsay evidence should be evaluated on its own. The notion that
judgments about the probative value and admissibility of hearsay should be individualized is a popular one among academics. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note
5, at 691 (arguing that the rigid definitional approach of the Federal Rules of
Evidence does not work well); Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce of Hearsay,
46 IowA L. REv. 331, 355 (1961) (advocating conversion of hearsay rule from
one of exlusion into one of discretion); Irving Younger, Reflections on the RuZe
Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L. REv. 281, 293 (1980) (noting that there is no rule
against hearsay, but only against unreliable evidence). We reserve judgment,
however, about the wisdom of requiring judges to make individualized judgments of probative value when considering the admissibility of hearsay.
Although we decidedly believe that the probative value of hearsay depends on
a practically infinite variety of evidentiary details, and that the probative value
of different instances of the same type of hearsay varies widely, we are not unmindful of the fact that considerations such as administrative convenience
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principles, such as those that exclude "ordinary" hearsay statements, are insensitive to details that might dramatically alter
or even reverse the probative value of the out-of-court statements that such principles cover. However, this fact alone does
not show that coarse legal categorizations are irrational or that
any particular coarse legal categorization is irrational, inefficient, or unwise. Coarse principles sometimes are an appropriate response to hard and subtle problems. We do not always
have the time to reason as carefully as we would like. Principles that incorporate coarse categories amount to rules of
thumb. A rule of thumb is sometimes an efficient strategy for
dealing with otherwise intractable complexity and subtlety.
must be taken into account. See Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to
Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 62-67 (1987) (discussing various considerations for retaining hearsay rules). But see Christopher B. Mueller, PostModern Hearsay Reforrm. The Importance of Complerity, 76 MINN. L. REV.
367, 396-97 (1992) (Mueller discounts the argument that lawyers need hearsay
rules because lawyers preparing for trial need to "know what they are up
against." Mueller argues that it is "not clear that judges will perform better
without [hearsay] rules to apply" because "even discretionary rules will produce doctrinal complexity."). Moreover, the problem of analytical complexity
must be taken into account. If full analysis of the probative value of each
piece of hearsay evidence is not possible, coarse categorizations of hearsay evidence may be the most sophisticated way of dealing with hearsay admissibility
problems.

